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THE NUMBER OF RATIONAL POINTS OF HYPERELLIPTIC CURVES OVER
SUBSETS OF FINITE FIELDS
KRISTINA NELSON, JO´ZSEF SOLYMOSI, FOSTER TOM, AND CHING WONG
Abstract. We prove two related concentration inequalities concerning the number of rational points
of hyperelliptic curves over subsets of a finite field. In particular, we investigate the probability of a
large discrepancy between the numbers of quadratic residues and non-residues in the image of such
subsets over uniformly random hyperelliptic curves of given degrees. We find a constant probability
of such a high difference and show the existence of sets with an exceptionally large discrepancy.
1. Introduction
Let q be a prime power and let Fq be the finite field with q elements. A curve E : y
2 = f(x)
(together with a point of infinity O) is called an elliptic curve over Fq if f(x) ∈ Fq[x] is a cubic
polynomial having distinct roots in the algebraic closure Fq of Fq. The set of rational points of E in
Fq is
E(Fq) = {(x, y) ∈ Fq × Fq : y2 = f(x)} ∪ {O}.
Suppose that q is odd. Using the fact that there are (q − 1)/2 invertible quadratic residues and
(q − 1)/2 non-residues in Fq, one can approximate the size of E(Fq) as follows. For each x ∈ Fq,
the probability of f(x) being a non-zero square in Fq, and hence contributing 2 points to E(Fq), is
about 1/2. With probability about 1/2 there is no point in E(Fq) having the first coordinate x ∈ Fq.
Therefore, #E(Fq) is expected to be close to q + 1. Indeed, Hasse [2] proved, in 1936, that the error
in this estimate is at most 2
√
q:
|#E(Fq)− (q + 1)| ≤ 2√q.
Knowledge of #E(Fq) is crucial in elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which is considered to be more
efficient than the classical cryptosystems, like RSA [6]. The security of ECC depends on the difficulty of
solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). The best known algorithm to solve
ECDLP in finite fields is Pollard’s Rho Algorithm [5], which requires O(
√
p) time complexity, where p
is the prime factor of q. However, some well studied elliptic curves or elliptic curves of certain forms
are not good candidates for ECC. For instance, if the number of rational points of an elliptic curve E
in Fp is exactly p, where p is a prime, then the running time of solving the ECDLP is O(log p), see [9].
Using verifiably random elliptic curves in ECC can ensure higher security. Hyperelliptic curves can
also be used in cryptography, see [1] for more details; however, the verifiability of random hyperelliptic
curves is much harder, see [3, 7].
In this paper, we investigate the behaviour of random hyperelliptic curves over subsets S of Fq. We
are interested in the hyperelliptic curves E : y2 = f(x) where f(x) is a polynomial in Fq[x] of degree
4k − 1 (k ≥ 1) having distinct roots in Fq. Denote by E(Fq, S) the rational points of E in Fq where
the x-coordinate is in S, i.e.
E(Fq, S) = {(x, y) ∈ S × Fq : y2 = f(x)}.
We remark that the point of infinity O is not included in E(Fq, S). The approximation we have
described for #E(Fq) suggests that the expected value of #E(Fq, S) is about #S. For random hyper-
elliptic curves E over Fq, the probability that the error |#E(Fq, S)−#S| is small has been extensively
studied, see [4, 8] for example.
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On the other hand, it is easy to see that there exist many hyperelliptic curves of any (positive) even
degree so that the error |#E(Fp, S) −#S| is very large. Indeed, the error is about #S when f(x) is
the square of any non-constant polynomial in Fq[x], for any S ⊂ Fp.
However, an error bound is not obvious in the case of hyperelliptic curves of odd degree, which we
study in the probabilistic setting. Equivalently, we examine the difference between the numbers of
quadratic residues and non-residues in the image multiset f(S). Using 4k-wise independence, we show
that all subsets S of Fq behave similarly, in the sense that the interested discrepancy is proportional
to
√
#S has a positive probability which depends only on the degree of the curve.
Theorem 1. Given a positive integer k and ε > 0, there exist δ > 0 and a threshold N such that
the following holds: for every odd prime power q > N , if a curve E : y2 = f(x) is chosen uni-
formly at random among all degree 4k− 1 hyperelliptic curves over Fq, then with a probability at least
(4π3/2/e3)2−2k − ε, we have
|#E(Fq, S)−#S| > δ
√
#S,
for any set S ⊂ Fq with #S ≥ N .
Theorem 2. Given a positive integer k, there exist a threshold N and ε > 0 such that the following
holds: for every odd prime power q > N , if a curve E : y2 = f(x) is chosen uniformly at random
among all degree 4k − 1 hyperelliptic curves over Fq, then with a probability at least ε, we have
|#E(Fq, S)−#S| > 0.8577
√
k
√
#S,
for any set S ⊂ Fq with #S ≥ N .
These two theorems imply that one can expect large deviation of magnitude
√
#S. In the last
section, we show that for small sets S of prime fields Fp, the error is often much larger.
2. Preliminaries
Throughout this section, let q be an odd prime power and let n, k be positive integers such that
4k < n ≤ q. Suppose S = {s1, . . . , sn} ⊂ Fq, and
f(x) =
4k−1∑
j=0
ajx
j ∈ Fq[x]
is chosen uniformly at random.
We denote by #QR, #NR and #R the numbers of si ∈ S such that f(si) is an invertible quadratic
residue, a quadratic non-residue and zero in Fq, respectively. Then, n = #QR + #NR + #R. It
follows that, provided the curve E : y2 = f(x) forms a degree 4k − 1 hyperelliptic curve over Fq, the
discrepancy we are interested in is
(1) |#E(Fq, S)− n| = |2#QR+#R − n| = |#QR−#NR| .
This suggests we look at the random variables Xi =
(f(si)
q
)
, where
(
a
q
)
, is the Legendre symbol defined
as (
a
q
)
=


0, if a is the zero in Fq,
1, if a is a non-zero square in Fq,
−1, otherwise.
We note that among all polynomials f(x) ∈ Fq[x] of degree at most 3, only a small fraction fail
to form elliptic curves. Indeed, the exceptions, where f(x) has degree strictly less than three or has
multiple roots, contribute q3 + q2(q − 1) of all the q4 polynomials considered. When q is large, such
exceptions are negligible. This situation generalizes to hyperelliptic curves.
Lemma 3. Let q be a prime power and let k be a positive integer. There is a constant c = cq,k
such that all but at most a fraction c/q of the polynomials in Fq[x] of degree at most 4k − 1 define a
hyperelliptic curve of degree 4k − 1 over Fq.
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Hence, the probability that, among all degree 4k − 1 hyperelliptic curves over Fq, the discrepancy
(1) is larger than some δ
√
n is at least the probability that, among all polynomials of degree at most
4k− 1 over Fq, the absolute value of the sum of the random variables Xi is larger than the same δ√n
minus cq,k/q, i.e.
(2) P(|#E(Fq, S)− n| > δ
√
n) ≥ P
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ√n
)
− cq,k
q
.
In the next two subsections, we will first estimate the higher moments
Ej := E


(
1√
n
n∑
i=1
Xi
)j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ 4k,
by finding their main order, and then give lower bounds on the interested probabilities involving the
random variables Xi’s.
2.1. Estimating E2k and E4k. Since f(x) ∈ Fq[x] is a random polynomial of degree at most 4k − 1,
the random variables Xi exhibit 4k-wise independence. Indeed, by solving a system of linear equations,
the number of polynomials f(x) in Fq[x] of degree at most 4k − 1 satisfying
f(si1) = r1, f(si2) = r2, . . . , f(siℓ) = rℓ,
is exactly q4k−ℓ, given ℓ ≤ 4k, r1, . . . , rℓ ∈ Fq and distinct i1, . . . , iℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus,
E(Xh1i1 · · ·Xhℓiℓ )
=
∑
r1,...,rℓ∈Fq
P(f(si1) = r1, . . . , f(siℓ) = rℓ)
(
r1
q
)h1
· · ·
(
rℓ
q
)hℓ
=
∑
r1,...,rℓ∈Fq
q4k−ℓ
q4k
(
r1
q
)h1
· · ·
(
rℓ
q
)hℓ
=

 ∑
r1∈Fq
1
q
(
r1
q
)h1 · · ·

 ∑
rℓ∈Fq
1
q
(
rℓ
q
)hℓ
=

 ∑
r1∈Fq
P(f(si1) = r1)
(
r1
q
)h1 · · ·

 ∑
rℓ∈Fq
P(f(siℓ) = rℓ)
(
rℓ
q
)hℓ
= E(Xh1i1 ) · · ·E(Xhℓiℓ )
We also note that the random variables Xi only take the values 0, 1,−1, and so X2h−1i = Xi and
X2hi = X
2
i , for all h ≥ 1. Therefore we have
E(X2h−1i ) = E(Xi) =
∑
r∈Fq
P(f(si) = r)
(
r
q
)
=
∑
r∈Fq
1
q
(
r
q
)
= 0,
and
E(X2hi ) = E(X
2
i ) =
∑
r∈Fq
P(f(si) = r)
(
r
q
)2
=
∑
r∈Fq
1
q
(
r
q
)2
= 1− 1
q
.
To summarize the above two observations, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Let ℓ ≤ 4k, let h1, . . . , hℓ be positive integers, and let i1 . . . , iℓ be distinct numbers from
{1, . . . , n}. Then,
E(Xh1i1 · · ·Xhℓiℓ ) =


(
1− 1
q
)ℓ
, if h1, . . . , hℓ are all even numbers,
0, otherwise.
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Before we estimate the general Ej , let us compute E6 (when k ≥ 2) as a toy version.
E6 = E
(
1√
n
n∑
i=1
Xi
)6
=
1
n3

 n∑
i=1
E(X6i ) +
6!
4!2!
∑
i6=j
E(X4i X
2
j ) +
6!
2!2!2!
∑
i<j<k
E(X2iX
2
jX
2
k)


=
1
n3
(
n
(
1− 1
q
)
+ 15n(n− 1)
(
1− 1
q
)2
+ 90
(
n
3
)(
1− 1
q
)3)
= 15
(
1− 1
q
)3
− 15
n
(
1− 1
q
)2(
2− 3
q
)
+
1
n2
(
1− 1
q
)(
16− 45
q
+
30
q2
)
We derive in the lemma below how the number 15 in the leading term can be expressed in terms of
j = 6.
Lemma 5. For 1 ≤ j ≤ 4k, we have
Ej =


j!
2j/2(j/2)!
+Oj
(
1
n
)
, as n→∞, if j is an even number,
0, otherwise.
Proof. If j is an odd number, then every term in the multinomial expansion has at least one odd index,
and hence vanishes by Lemma 4.
Suppose now that j is an even integer. Using the multinomial theorem and Lemma 4, we have
Ej =
1
nj/2
E


(
n∑
i=1
Xi
)j
=
1
nj/2
E

 ∑
h1+···+hn=j
j!
h1! · · ·hn!
n∏
t=1
Xhtt


=
1
nj/2
∑
h1+···+hn=j
j!
h1! · · ·hn!E
(
n∏
t=1
Xhtt
)
=
1
nj/2
∑
h1+···+hn=j
hi even
j!
h1! · · ·hn!
(
1− 1
q
)#{i:hi>0}
=
1
nj/2
j/2∑
m=1
(
1− 1
q
)m
H(j,m),
where
H(j,m) =
∑
h1+···+hn=j
hi even
#{i:hi>0}=m
j!
h1! · · ·hn! =
(
n
m
) ∑
h′
1
+···+h′m=j
h′i>0 even
j!
h′1! · · ·h′m!
is a polynomial (with integer coefficients) in n of degree m. Therefore, the leading term of Ej comes
from the summand where m = j/2. In this case, h′i = 2 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ j/2 and so
H(j, j/2) =
(
n
j/2
)
j!
2j/2
has leading term
j!
(j/2)!2j/2
nj/2.
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It follows that
Ej =
1
nj/2
((
1− 1
q
)j/2
j!
(j/2)!2j/2
nj/2 + · · ·
)
=
(
1− 1
q
)j/2
j!
(j/2)!2j/2
+Oj
(
1
n
)
=
j!
(j/2)!2j/2
+Oj
(
1
n
)
,
as n→∞. 
In particular, for each fixed k,
E2k =
(2k)!
2kk!
+Ok
(
1
n
)
is bounded uniformly in n ≥ 1. As a consequence, one can have the following estimates, which will be
used later in our proof, using Stirling’s approximation. For all fixed k ≥ 1, we have
(3) 2k
√
E2k ≥
√
2k
e
+Ok
(
1
n
)
,
and
(4)
E
2
2k
E4k
≥
(√
2π
e
)3
21/2−2k +Ok
(
1
n
)
,
as n→∞.
2.2. Lower bounding the probabilities.
Proposition 6. Under the setting stated in the beginning of this section, we have
(5) P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1√n
n∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
)
≥ (E2k − δ
2k)2
E4k − 2δ2kE2k + δ4k ,
for any 0 < δ < 1/2, and
(6) P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1√n
n∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2k
√
E2k − ε 12−o(1)
)
≥ ε > 0,
as ε→ 0.
Proof. Let c ≥ 1 be a parameter to be determined. Using second moment Markov’s inequality, one
can show that for 0 < λ < c2k,
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1√n
n∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ > 2k
√
ck −
√
λ
)
= P


(
1√
n
n∑
i=1
Xi
)2k
− ck > −
√
λ


≥ P


∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
1√
n
n∑
i=1
Xi
)2k
− ck
∣∣∣∣∣∣ <
√
λ


≥ 1− 1
λ
E




(
1√
n
n∑
i=1
Xi
)2k
− ck


2


= 1− c
2k − 2ckE2k + E4k
λ
.
(7)
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To prove (5), we take λ = (ck − δ2k)2, where δ > 0 is small. Maximizing the right hand side of (7)
over c, we see that the maximum is
1− c
2k − 2ckE2k + E4k
(ck − δ2k)2 =
(E2k − δ2k)2
E4k − 2δ2kE2k + δ4k ,
when
ck =
E4k − δ2kE2k
E2k − δ2k .
Now we prove (6). To make
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1√n
n∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ > 2k
√
ck −
√
λ
)
≥ ε,
we take
λ =
c2k − 2ckE2k + E4k
1− ε .
Since we require c2k > λ, it follows that
c2k − 2ckE2k + E4k < c2k − c2kε,
and therefore
η := εck < 2E2k − E4k
ck
< 2E2k.
To compute the leading terms of
2k
√
ck −√λ as ε→ 0, we first use the binomial series to expand the
numerator of
√
λ as
ck
√
1−
(
2E2k
ck
− E4k
c2k
)
= ck
(
1− E2k 1
ck
+
E4k − E22k
2
1
c2k
+ O
(
1
c3k
))
,(8)
as c→∞. Indeed, the bracket inside the square root in (8) is small in view of Lemma 5. To get √λ,
we multiply (8) to
1√
1− ε = 1 +
1
2
ε+
3
8
ε2 +O(ε3).
Substituting ck = η/ε, we have
ck −
√
λ
=
η
ε
[
1−
(
1 +
1
2
ε+
3
8
ε2 +O(ε3)
)(
1− E2k
η
ε+
E4k − E22k
2η2
ε2 +O
(
ε3
η3
))]
= E2k − 1
2
η +
(
E
2
2k − E4k
2
+
E2k
2
η − 3
8
η2
)
ε
η
+O
(
ε2
η2
)
.
We may now take η satisfying
√
ε ≪ η ≪ 1 so that the terms in the last line are indeed arranged in
decreasing order of magnitude. Therefore,
2k
√
ck −
√
λ =
2k
√
E2k − ε 12−o(1) = 2k
√
E2k − ε 12−o(1),
as ε→ 0, establishing (6). 
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3. Proofs of the Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Write n = #S, as in Section 2. Given ε > 0, we choose N large enough so that
cq,k/N < ε/3, where the constant cq,k is from Lemma 3, and the error appearing in (4) has an absolute
value less than ε/3.
Since E4k > E2k ≥ 1/2, there exists a small δ > 0 such that∣∣∣∣∣ (1 −
δ2k
E2k
)2
1− 2δ2k E2k
E4k
+ δ4k 1
E4k
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε3 E4kE22k .
Together with (2), (5) and (4), we have
P(|#E(Fq, S)− n| > δ
√
n) ≥ P
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ√n
)
− cq,k
q
≥ E
2
2k
E4k
(1− δ2k
E2k
)2
1− 2δ2k E2k
E4k
+ δ4k 1
E4k
− ε
3
≥ E
2
2k
E4k
− ε
3
− ε
3
≥
(√
2π
e
)3
21/2−2k − ε,
as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Similarly we write n = #S. Using the estimate (3), we choose N so large and ε
so small that the interested lower bound in (6) is large:
2k
√
E2k − ε 12−o(1) > 0.8577
√
k.
Here 0.8577 is a number strictly smaller than
√
2/e. Now, increase N if necessary, we also have
cq,k/N < ε/2. Then, by (2) and (6), we have
P(|#E(Fq, S)− n| > 0.8577
√
k
√
n)
≥ P
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ > 0.8577
√
k
√
n
)
− cq,k
q
≥ P
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ >
(
2k
√
E2k − ε 12−o(1)
)√
n
)
− ε
2
≥ ε
2
.

4. Sets with exceptionally large discrepancy
So far we have considered sets of arbitrarily large size. We will show, as one may expect, that if
n is a constant, then for each prime p large enough, there is a probability α > 0 that the error is
much larger than
√
n, for β
(
p
n
)
of the subsets S ⊂ Fp of size n. In particular, for each n, there is a
probability 2−n−1 that a randomly chosen subset S ⊂ Fp of size n has the following property — a
randomly chosen monic separable cubic f over Fp has a probability 2
−n−1 so that f(S) consists only
of non-zero quadratic residues or quadratic non-residues.
Let F be the set of monic, separable cubics over Fp. Note that #F = p3−p2. Let m,n be constants
independent of p such that n − 2m > √n. We construct a bipartite graph G with (pn) ‘S-vertices’ in
one partition, each associated with a set S ⊂ Fp of size n, and p3 − p2 ‘f-vertices’ in the other, each
7
associated with an f ∈ F . We draw an edge between the vertex corresponding to f and the vertex
corresponding to S when
∣∣∣∑si∈S (f(si)p )
∣∣∣ ≥ n − 2m. Fix f ∈ F , and let Q ⊂ Fp be the set of points
mapped by f to a non-zero quadratic residue, and N ⊂ Fp be those points mapped to a non-residue.
Let p/2 +Af be the size of the larger of these two sets. Then the degree of the vertex associated to f
in G is at least
(9)
(
p/2−Af
m
)(
p/2 +Af
n−m
)
.
By Hasse’s theorem we have Af ≤ √p, and so (9) is bounded below by(
p/2−√p
m
)(
p/2−√p
n−m
)
=
(
p
n
)[(
n
m
)
2−n + o(1)
]
,
as p→∞. Thus the number of edges in our graph, E, is at least(
p
n
)[(
n
m
)
2−n + o(1)
]
(p3 − p2).
Now if only β
(
p
n
)
of the S-vertices achieve degree ≥ α(p3 − p2), then we have
E ≤ β
(
p
n
)
(p3 − p2) +
(
p
n
)
(1− β)α(p3 − p2),
and so
β ≥ 1
1− α
[(
n
m
)
2−n − α+ o(1)
]
> 0,
as p→∞, provided that α > 0 is small enough.
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